A …rm's manager may choose to underperform in the short-term in order to boost subsequent pay: the apparent value of subsequent incentive compensation is diminished, requiring more overall pay to meet the manager's outside option. A greater weight on short-term compensation can counteract these incentives, provided liquidity constraints do not bind. Shifting to more long-term compensation, such as restricted stock and vesting conditions, generally worsens illiquidity and incentive compatibility problems. An extension considers reporting: managers have an incentive to under-report the …rm's value, which can be remedied by granting short-term stock-based compensation.
Introduction
An extensive literature explores the optimal contours of performance-based pay and the proper mix of long-term and short-term incentives -a problem that has immense practical and regulatory implications. This literature has focused on incentive compatibility, and has generally found that long-term instruments (such as restricted or delayed vesting compensation) are preferable to short-term ones: they combat opportunism (such as misreporting), reduce excessive risk, and align the interests of managers with shareholders.
The contribution of this paper, in contrast, is to show that short-term incentives are necessary to combat intentional underperformance in the short term: managers can increase the value of their future compensation by making the …rm appear to be of lower value than it actually is. Driving this dynamic are participation constraints that hold in each period, as opposed to holding in expectation over the aggregate tenure. Further, under such assumptions, this paper shows that the e¤ect of certain long-term compensation instruments, such as restriction and delayed vesting, can be signi…cantly negative.
The motivation for this paper arises out of the …nancial crisis of and, more particularly, the reform e¤orts that have followed. Short-termism is the bugbear of the post-…nancial crisis capital markets. Among other things, it is claimed that short-term incentives lead managers to "hide bad news [and] in ‡ate earnings" (Co¤ee 2006 ), assume too much risk (Bebchuk & More reforms appear to be coming down the pike: as part of her 2016 presidential campaign, for instance, Hillary Clinton has promised "a number of ideas designed to tackle... overly short-term focus on corporate strategy," with (yet unspeci…ed) reforms addressing shareholder activism, capital gains rates, and executive compensation. Tax Rates, The Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2015 benign motives for granting short term compensation, as well as the further question of whether reforms that mandate or subsidize long-term compensation will be helpful. This paper addresses those questions. The principal …nding is that even non-myopic shareholders will put a heavier weight on short-term compensation in order to promote optimal managerial e¤ort (and, in an extension, optimal reporting), and that reforms designed to undo that weighting likely have negative e¤ects.
In the model developed in this paper, three factors drive short-term weighting: learning about …rm type, unobservable e¤ort, and binding participation constraints in each period. The manager's e¤ort in each of two periods in‡uences the likelihood of high cash ‡ows. Because the shareholder does not observe e¤ort but the manager does, the shareholder's forecast of …rm type and value in period 2 departs from that of the manager. Hence, the manager can bias downward the shareholder's forecast by exerting less e¤ort than expected in period 1. Where the shareholder's forecast is lower, the expected value of incentive compensation (modeled as a share of the period's cash ‡ows) paid to the manager in period 2 will be lower. This requires the shareholder to pay a greater amount of wage compensation in period 2 in order to meet the manager's reservation wage to ensure the manager's participation. Overall, then, the manager has an incentive to shirk in the …rst period in order to boost her compensation in the second period. In e¤ect, the manager has long-term incentives to "take a dive" in the short term. Similarly, the manager has long-term incentives to under-report value in the short-term, even if such misreporting is destructive to some degree.
Anticipating this result, the shareholder must award greater short-term performance-based compensation in order to ensure optimal e¤ort; short-term compensation will therefore be more heavily weighted than it otherwise would be. While a …rst-best outcome is still achievable without liquidity constraints (such as the ability to pay the manager a negative salary), liquidity constraints may cause rents to the manager in some cases and a lack of otherwise-e¢ cient production in others.
Attempting to undo this dynamic through commonly proposed reforms, such as restricted stock and delayed vesting, generally makes things worse.
Restricted stock (i.e., any grant of period 1 cash ‡ows must be bundled with some degree of period 2 cash ‡ows) does reduce the shirking incentive but exacerbates the liquidity problems: either the manager's rents will be greater or a greater range of economic production is forestalled. Delayed vesting actually destroys incentives: to the extent early cash ‡ows are high, these reduce the manager's subsequent pay, rendering her indi¤erent to …rst period outcomes.
An extension of the basic model shows that the same "taking a dive" dynamic applies to reporting. By making the …rm appear to be worth less via a low report in the short term, the manager ensures a higher overall value of his subsequent compensation. The shareholder can remedy this problem by awarding more short-term stock compensation (which requires forcing the manager to sell it in the short-term).
Relation to prior literature
This paper follows the literature on optimal contracting and executive compensation. In the optimal contracting literature, provided that shareholders control the …rm and have broad freedom and ability to write contracts, there is generally little role for government intervention. Contract theory has described quite detailed optimal pay arrangements -for example, the dynamic savings accounts developed in Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012), in which compensation is history-dependent, requires rebalancing and gradual vesting, and must account for factors such as the executive's ability to save.
Managerial power and myopia
It has been observed, however, that executive compensation schemes typically depart from what the optimal contracting literature prescribes. According to the "managerial power" theory, these departures arise because executives have hijacked the …rm and set their own pay policies; executives tend to choose, among other things, short-termist pay which allows them to pro…t easily from short-term strategies or manipulations of stock price (Bebchuk, Spindler (2015) shows that where short-term results signal managerial e¤ort, non-myopic shareholders may choose short-term compensation, even though it causes harmful misreporting, due to its relative cost-e¤ectiveness.
The paper most similar to the instant one is Acharya, John & Sundaram (2000), which addresses the optimality of resetting stock options. They derive an equilibrium in which shareholders will choose to be able to reset options (which are based upon the terminal value of the …rm) upon interim drops in stock price in order to maintain long-term incentive compatibility: deeply "underwater" options may fail to compel e¤ort because exceeding the exercise price may not be su¢ ciently attainable. This resetting comes at a cost, since executives know that they will, to an extent, be insured against bad outcomes; hence, more up-front incentive compensation is required in order to guarantee early-period incentive compatibility.
The instant paper does, however, depart signi…cantly from Acharya, John & Sundaram (2000) . This paper focuses on the role of short-term compensation, not considered in Acharya et al (all compensation there is long-term, in that it does not take into account interim price movements). The dynamic at play in the instant paper involves the participation constraint (also not considered in Acharya et al.), not the incentive compatibility constraint, which drives the option resetting result. Acharya et al. also does not consider learning about …rm type (there is no unobserved type); in the instant paper, unobserved type gives managers an incentive cause the …rm to perform poorly (or to create the appearance thereof) in the short-term.
Renegotiability and Participation Constraints
The model developed in the instant paper utilizes renegotiation of the manager's contract in light of learning about the …rm and the manager's outside option. This assumption of binding participation (or individual rationality) constraints in each period follows in the spirit of Oyer (2004), who …nds that lower-than-expected levels of performance based compensation may be optimal due to the e¤ect of the "often overlooked participation constraint": managers'compensation must satisfy the reservation wage, which depends on economy-wide boom and bust cycles, rather than individual …rm performance. Further, in part due to the success of the managerial power theory, …rms are encouraged under modern corporate and securities law to scrutinize the e¤ec-tiveness and amount of executive compensation on a continuous basis. Boards cannot abdicate their duty to oversee managerial pay. Long-term, hands-o¤ contracts may raise the possibility of managerial windfalls, and subject the …rm and board to criticism and even lawsuits. Public …rms are subject to ever-increasing compensation disclosure requirements (including a duty to report risks related to disclosure) as well as shareholder "say on pay." Such factors suggest that the ability to enter into binding, long-term employment contracts is substantially limited.
The model
The shareholder and manager of a …rm play a game in which the shareholder awards the manager equity-based compensation in order to induce the manager to exert costly e¤ort. Each party is risk-neutral.
The are periods, t = 1; 2: The …rm realizes cash ‡ows of x 1 and x 2 , random variables, at the ends of periods 1 and 2, respectively. Cash ‡ows may be either high or low in each period (x t 2 fX t ; 0g; X t > 0) Firms may be either high or low type, i 2 fH; Lg ; with Pr(H) = h; Pr(L) = 1 h: High type …rms having a greater likelihood of realizing high cash ‡ows: Pr(X t jH) > Pr(X t jL). More concretely, the production technology depends jointly on managerial e¤ort and the …rm's type: Pr(X t jH) = a H +et 2
and Pr(
; with e t ; a H ; a L 2 [0; 1] The terms a H and a L are exogenous parameters corresponding to …rm type, a H > a L ; while e t is the manager's choice of e¤ort in period t. For simplicity, it is assumed that a H = 1 and a L = 0: The cost to the manager of exerting e¤ort is c t (e t ) = C t e t , where C t is a constant.
The course of play is as follows. At the start, the …rm's type, H or L, is randomly determined by nature; neither the shareholder nor the manager observe type. At the beginning of period t = 1, the shareholder awards to the The manager has a reservation utility w in each period, and because the manager is free to leave, and the shareholder is free to …re him, the reservation wage must be satis…ed in each period, conditional on the history. Termination of the manager leads to replacement with an identical manager. The manager privately chooses his e¤ort e 1 , which costs him c(e 1 ) = C 1 e 1 . Maximal e¤ort is assumed to be socially e¢ cient: 8e t ;
; as is production for any …rm:
X t c(e t ) w 0; 8 e t . Time 1 cash ‡ows x 1 are then realized, x 1 2 fX 1 ; 0g; and observed by the shareholder and manager.
In period t = 2, the shareholder, having observed x 1 ; revises her estimate of the …rm's type. The shareholder then chooses w 2 ; which as before includes some level of equity-based award and salary, s 2 and ! 2 , again subject to the constraint of satisfying the manager's reservation utility w: The manager then chooses second-period e¤ort e 2 at a private cost of C 2 e 2 . Final cash ‡ows x 2 are realized, and the game concludes.
3 Solving for the …rst-best outcome: unrestricted shares of cash‡ows 3.1 Baseline: one shot game or precommitment
In the game where the manager and shareholder can precommit to a wage contract, or in the one shot version of the game, one can show that the contract
The manager's IC constraint in each period is
Substituting in the production function yields max et s t . The wage that then minimizes the cost of the compensation contract is given by the individual rationality (IR) constraint, which is
In the two period game where the manager can precommit to a contract over both periods, the shareholder o¤ers the contract w t = (s t ; ! t ) for t = 1; 2.
While E[w t ] + C t e t = w; in the case that
that is, the expected value of the second period compensation contract is less than the manager's reservation wage. If given the choice to leave the …rm, the manager would do so. Conversely, where x 1 = X 1 , the expected value of the compensation contract would exceed the manager's reservation wage, and the shareholder could gain from adjusting down the wage to cause the IR2 constraint to bind. fool the shareholder into believing the …rm is of worse type than it really is, the manager would receive higher overall pay. Mechanisms to mislead the shareholder could include misreporting (discussed in an extension) or, as discussed in this section, by undertaking less e¤ort, which is unobservable. By "taking a dive" in period 1, the manager can secure a higher level of pay in period 2.
This section formally considers that dynamic and solves for the equilibrium contract that guarantees e¢ cient e¤ort in each period. The speci…c incentive mechanism assumed here is a share of the …rm's cash ‡ows, s t , in each period. As demonstrated, higher …rst period incentive compensation is required than the naive contract would assign. In the extensions section, longer-term compensation measures, such as restricted stock and non-vesting stock, are considered.
Manager's choice of e¤ort at t = 2
The manager chooses his e¤ort at time t = 2 to maximize the value of his compensation contracts w 1 and w 2 .
IC2:
Because c(e 2 ) and E[x 2 ] are each a linear function of e 2 , the argmax is a corner solution, e 2 2 f0; 1g: The condition for the manager to exert e¤ort is
The manager must also consider whether to participate at all in period 2, 
Removing terms that are not functions of the maximand, this is equivalent to:
IC2 : e 2 = arg max s 2 X 2 e 2 2 Ce 2
Because the manager's payo¤ is linear in e 2 , he will choose e 2 = 0 where 1 2 s 2 X 2 < C and e 2 = 1 where
Rearranging terms, the IC2 condition pins down the minimum share to be o¤ered to obtain e¤ort:
The manager's IR2 constraint is:
Because e¤ort and participation are assumed to always be e¢ cient, both the IC2 and IR2 conditions will be satis…ed in equilibrium. Further, IR2 and IC2 may both bind because, absent liquidity constraints (an assumption to be relaxed later) the shareholder can …rst use IC2 to determine the minimum share award s 2 and then adjust the ‡at wage ! 2 up or down as necessary to make IR2 bind.
Combining IC2 and IR2 yields the salary ! 2 :
The above condition shows that the smaller is the expected value of the …rm at the end of period t = 1 (i.e., the smaller isÊ[x 2 jx 1 ]), the larger is the manager's salary compensation ! 2 . If the manager could, ceteris paribus, induce the shareholder to have a negatively biased forecast, he would do so:
The manager's choice of e¤ort at t = 1
At time t = 1; the manager must make his initial choice of e¤ort. The manager chooses period 1 e¤ort e 1 to maximize the overall sum of his compensation in periods t = 1; 2: The choice of period 1 e¤ort a¤ects the expected value of period 2 compensation because the success or failure of the …rm (which depends partly upon e¤ort) will a¤ect the shareholder's perception of …rm value and hence the compensation package that the shareholder will award the manager. 
= max
The manager's objective function is linear in e 1 , which results in a corner solution:
])+C; and e 1 = 0 otherwise.
Under the assumption that e¤ort is e¢ cient,
The manager's period 1 individual rationality constraint must also be met, which is given by IR1:
The shareholder's compensation decision in period t=1
At the beginning of the game, the shareholder must decide what compensation to o¤er the manager in the …rst period. The shareholder chooses the compensation contract to maximize the value of the …rm's …rst period cash ‡ows, x 1 ; net of compensation paid.
subject to
The shareholder achieves the optimum compensation contract w 1 by choosing the minimum s 1 such that 1 2
Ê [x 2 j0]) + C; which satis…es the IC1 constraint, and then either raising or
] Ce 1 = w; which satis…es the IR1 constraint.
Results and discussion
Summing up, the equilibrium solution to the game is:
where
Notable results include the following:
More short-term compensation. The solution to this game requires more short-term compensation than the naive case. The naive …rst period share award is s 1 = 2
; whereas the equilibrium solution here is
The additional term, 2
Ê , derives from the fact that a lower perceived value of the …rm lowers the perceived value of the manager's second period incentive compensation, which requires more salary to be paid.
Comparing the weighting on short-term versus long-term compensation, there is relatively more short-term compensation awarded than long-term compensation, all other things being equal. That is, if C 1 = C 2 = C and 
First-best outcomes and liquidity constraints. Despite the heavier weighting on short-term equity compensation, this outcome is not necessarily harmful to shareholders. If there are no liquidity constraints on the manager, then to the extent that share compensation needs to be raised to support incentive compatibility, the salary can be reduced commensurately, such that the net expected value of compensation is, in equilibrium, the same as the reservation wage. In such an environment, e¢ cient e¤ort is always exerted.
However, liquidity constraints can impact shareholder welfare: if the wage ! has a lower bound of ! > ! 1 , then there are instances in which the …rst-best compensation package is not feasible due to the dynamic described here.
In such a case, the shareholder would have to choose whether to pay the manager more; with the manager receiving an information rent in period 1, or the shareholder would have to forego e¤ort and production. The …rst extension models restricted stock, and the second considers delayed vesting. The e¤ect of restricted stock is to exacerbate illiquidity problems:
a greater range of …rst-best contracts becomes infeasible than in the nonrestricted case. Delayed vesting can actually negate early-period incentives to undertake e¤ort.
Restricted, fully vested compensation
Consider the case where regulatory mandates require a certain proportion of the manager's performance-based compensation to be long term compensation.
3
Such a mandate can be modeled as requiring a proportion of any …rst period grant to consist of both …rst and second period cash‡ows x 1 and x 2 . The …rst period compensation contract is then of the form
It is assumed that all grants vest immediately (non-vesting is considered in the Section 4.2).
Decisions at t = 2: The shareholder's inference of …rm typeÊ[x 2 jx 1 ]
proceeds as in the basic model, and again the shareholder's objective function
The manager's IC2 constraint takes into account restricted stock: e 2 = arg max (s 1 + s 2 )Ê[x 2 jx 1 ] c 2 (e 2 ); which yields the second period share award:
Restricted stock also factors into the manager's IR2 constraint and pins down the period two wage:
It is apparent that the restricted award s 1 reduces, share for share, the share that must be awarded to induce incentive compatibility in period 2, and reduces by s 1 Ê [x 2 jx 1 ; e 2 ] the number of dollars that must be paid as salary to satisfy the manager's participation constraint.
Decisions at t = 1:
At time t = 1, the shareholder's problem is
and IR1.
From the IC1 constraint, the manager chooses e¤ort to solve the following problem:
Expanding the expectations yields:
After eliminating non-e 1 terms:
The objective is linear in e 1 , yielding a corner solution of e 1 = 1 if
, and e 1 = 0 otherwise.
It is notable that restricted stock s 1 does reduce the manager's incentive to slack in order to make the …rm appear less valuable. This is because: (i) the total amount of incentive compensation in period 2 is pegged at 2
(ii) the closer to zero is s 2 ; the less e¤ect incentive compensation has on the wage ! 2 ; and (iii) therefore the shareholder's biased forecastÊ[x 2 jx 1 ] also has less e¤ect as s 2 approaches zero. So, for example, in the case where
, second period incentive compensation is s 2 = 0, and the net e¤ect of the shareholder's biased forecast on the manager's compensation is zero.
The manager's …rst period individual rationality constraint (IR1) takes into account the value of the restricted stock because it vests immediately.
Summary and comparison to naive case and non-restricted case.
Summing up, we have the following equilibrium solution (with the subscript R denoting the share restriction condition):
Greater weight on short-term compensation. As in the basic model, the proportion of short-term compensation awarded will generally exceed what the naive incentive compensation contract would award. Consider the naive share award with restricted stock: s 1 = 2
: This exceeds the naive …rst period award if
; in other words, so long as second period naive award s 2 would be positive. (This is likely the case in reality: negative value implies that the shareholder would be granting negative share compensation in period 2, which requires an increase in the salary ! 2 commensurate with the shareholder's forecast of value; in such a case, the manager has incentives to in ‡ate the apparent value of the …rm.) Hence, even with restricted stock, it is necessary for the shareholder to weight short-term compensation more heavily than the naive incentive award would imply. This is easy to see, for instance, if C 1 = 0. Following the naive case, it would appear that no incentive compensation is necessary to compel …rst period e¤ort (s 1 = 0), and any positive award would be "excessive" short term compensation; however, in reality, the manager would choose zero e¤ort due to the e¤ect on second period salary. Therefore, a larger award, of
; is necessary to ensure incentive compatibility.
Restricted stock reduces slacking, but exacerbates illiquidity. While restricted stock can reduce the incentive to slack in period 1, it also exacerbates potential illiquidity problems. As noted above, as the restriction constraint is greater ( increasing), more of the second-period incentive compensation is taken up with restricted stock. So, for instance, if restricted stock grants are su¢ ciently large that s 1R = 2
, no further grant of stock will take place in period 2 (s 2 = 0), and the second period wage does not take equity grants into account (! 2R = w + C). E¤ectively, the shareholder's misestimation affects equally both the manager's stock incentives s 1R Ê [x 2 jx 1 ] and reservation
The tradeo¤, however, is that the shareholder has given the manager, free and clear, a substantial amount of incentive compensation that is not contingent on period 2 participation. This requires the payment of additional salary ! 2R to ensure the manager's period 2 participation. Absent illiquidity concerns, this can be made up for by lowering the period 1 salary ! 1R
commensurately. Where the manager's liquidity is limited, such that ! 1R is bounded from below by !, then the shareholder is faced with the choice of either compensating the manager in excess of the reservation wage w (with the excess being a rent to the manager) or else foregoing otherwise e¢ cient production.
To see that the illiquidity problem is of greater severity in the restricted case than in the unrestricted case, consider a comparison of ! 1 and ! 1R . The illiquidity problem in period 1 is always worse if the following inequality is true:
Substituting in for s 1 ; s 1R ; and Ê = yX 2 , y 2 [0; 1=2], the above expression reduces to
; which must always be true because y 2 [0; 1 2 ]. Thus, to the extent that there is a lower bound on the wage compensation that the manager can receive in any period, restricted stock exacerbates illiquidity problems.
Delayed-vesting, restricted stock
To take another commonly compensation mechanism, suppose the manager's grant of stock in period 1 is contingent on her continued employment with the …rm in period 2. That is, the stock does not vest if the manager departs the …rm in period 2. As shown below, this has signi…cant negative incentive e¤ects.
Manager' s decision at t = 2. The IC2 constraint is unchanged from the restricted vesting case: for e 2 = 1;
. IR2 is, however, di¤erent since the manager forfeits her …rst period restricted stock if she leaves:
Shareholder' s decision at t = 2. As before, the shareholder has to draw an inference regarding x 2 , denoted asÊ[x 2 jx 1 ], in the same way as in the basic model. The manager's IC2 constraint provides the choice of stock compensation:
Manager' s decision at t = 1:
Because the expected value of the non-vesting stock will lower the period 2 wage, the manager's IC1 condition takes this into account. The manager's problem is:
This is equivalent to
The s 1 E[x 1 ] term cancel out because the manager's …rst period returns will reduce wage compensation in the second period, dollar for dollar.
Removing terms not a function of e 1 ; IC1 is:
This is a negative function of e 1 , and hence the manager always chooses e 1 = 0: This indicates that vesting conditional on retention is a poor means of inducing e¤ort: the manager foresees that non-vesting bonus compensation based on period 1 returns will simply reduce, dollar for dollar, the compensation the manager receives in period 2. Summary and discussion. In equilibrium, with all …rst period performance based compensation being non-vesting, the following results obtain (the subscript N denotes the non-vesting model).
Obviously, this alternative is highly ine¢ cient: …rst period e¤ort is always zero. This occurs because high period 1 payo¤s reduce the manager's wage in period 2. The manager, therefore, is indi¤erent to period 1 outcomes.
This suggests that delayed vesting can be harmful to …rm value where precommitment is not otherwise possible. If, as in this model, delayed vesting is conditioned on retention (or some other outcome that requires retention, such as period 2 performance), early-period incentives are seriously impaired, rather than improved.
Extension: reporting
This section demonstrates that the insights of the model extend readily to the reporting context. An extension of the basic model shows that managers have incentives to report falsely low value of the …rm. An award of short-term stock (i.e., stock that must be sold in the short-term) can rectify this problem.
The extension is as follows. Suppose that cash ‡ows are realized as before in period 1. However, the manager also can observe the …rm's type in period 1, and the manager makes a period 1 report of the …rm's type, R 2 fa H ; a L g :
In order to simplify the analysis to focus solely on reporting instead of effort, suppose that e¤ort does not factor in to period 1 production: period 1 production is given by a i 2 , while period 2 production is
. A false report causes harm to the …rm (this could be due to misallocation of resources, among other reasons): the probability of success in period 2 is reduced by
; a publicly-known parameter, such that the expected value of period 2 cash ‡ows is i +e 2 2 X 2 , which, in a slight abuse of notation, will be
Naive contract. Under the naive precommitment contract, s 2 = 2
However, where precommitment is not possible but the shareholder still utlizes the naive contract in period 1, the manager's second period wage will have to adjust to take into account …rm preformance:
This means that the manager's second period compensation will be lower when he issues a high report (R = a H ) than when he provides a low one (R = a L ). Formally, assuming the manager observes a high value of the …rm, under the naive contract the manager chooses to not defect from separation when
. Expanding those terms yields:
This condition is never true, and hence under the naive contract, the manager chooses never to pursue a pure separation strategy. That is, at least some of the time, the manager will choose to falsely report a low value of the …rm.
Optimal contract. Consider next the possibility that the shareholder rewards the manager based on the share's stock price at the end of period 1.
Letting s 1 be the shares so issued, the separation condition is:
Replacing terms,
Thus, a su¢ cient award of stock -that must be sold at the end of period 1 -can properly incentivize truthful reporting.
Note that awarding additional long-term compensation will do nothing to induce truthful reporting in period 1:
is not a function of reporting.
Further, even awarding the manager stock in period 1 is not su¢ cient: the manager would choose not to sell it for its arti…cially depressed value in period 1, and instead would hold it until termination of the game.
Conclusion
The model presented in this paper shows that, given widely applicable assumptions of unobservable e¤ort, learning about …rm type, and renegotiation, managers have incentives to cause the …rm to perform poorly in the shortterm. By making the …rm appear worse, the perceived value of the manager's subsequent incentive compensation appears lower, which requires more salary compensation to meet the manager's outside option. The manager may make the …rm appear worse by exerting sub-optimal e¤ort or, as shown in an extension, by under-reporting the …rm's value.
Shareholders can counter these incentives by providing a greater amount of short-term performance-based compensation. Provided that liquidity constraints are not too severe, shareholders can still arrive at …rst-best outcomes.
Certain proposed compensation reforms, designed to weight long-term incentives more heavily, are likely to be counterproductive. While some reforms, such as restricted stock, may reduce incentives to slack/misreport, they do so at the cost of exacerbating illiquidity problems, precluding a wider range of …rst-best outcomes. Other reforms, such as deferred vesting based on participation, can render incentive compatibility problems worse.
Appendix A: Short-term stock
The basic model employs shares of cash ‡ows as its instrument of incentive compensation. However, a commonly utilized instrument is paying the manager in stock, the price of which incorporates both current and expected future cash ‡ows. For completeness, that alternative is modeled here. The basic results remain the same.
Because …rst period compensation has no e¤ect on the manager's second period earnings, the second period compensation is the same as in the base case:
; ! 2 = w + C 2 2 s 1 e 1 X 1 + Ê C 1 e 1 , which yields s 1 = 2
As in all the other cases, s 1 is greater in the optimal, equilibrium case than in the naive case: 2
: Thus, even where the manager is paid based on stock price, which provides some incentive to in ‡ate value, the equilibrium solution where precommitment is impossible would lead the
